Time to take sides in the Honduran crisis for the US?

Honduras

On September 21, former Honduran ousted President Manuel Zelaya was smuggled into the Brazilian embassy in Tegucigalpa. It was believed, in first instance, Zelaya would be on his way to the United Nations’ head-quarters in New York. However, Zelaya arrived in El Salvador on a Venezuelan jet, and then aided into Honduras. It appears players within the international community consent to an agenda that breaks all international norms regarding the principle of nonintervention in other countries’ internal affairs.

Spanish Security World recently discussed how Brazilian foreign policy in Latin America has evolved from its typical ‘calculated blasé attitude, seeking to downplay the problem by invoking the nonintervention principle and favoring multilateral and negotiated solutions’, to a more activist and interventionist one; the shelter provided to Zelaya inside the Brazilian embassy is a clear example of such dramatic evolution.

But, what is Brazil to gain from aiding Zelaya back into Honduras or even seeking the use of force to bring him back to power? And what has occurred within Brazilian foreign policy that has caused this interventionist view. It is not very clear to many observers, but it is a calculated risk President Lula da Silva is taking, at least in this particular case, considering few international community members have stepped up to legitimize the Honduran interim government or an electoral process bestowed by it. Furthermore, Lula shrugged off the Honduran interim government’s ultimatum to define the status of Zelaya inside the Brazilian embassy within ten days claiming a coup government is in no position to force ultimatums upon Brazil.

Several problematic questions arise from whatever outcome results from the Honduran stalemate. First, the violation of the principle of nonintervention and its standing. Secondly, if the Honduran Supreme Court’s previous opinions and decisions, as well as those of the Honduran parliament, regarding international security cooperation arrangements and treaties were accepted as valid and within the international legal norm, why their decision to find Zelaya guilty of disrupting the constitutional order is not acceptable now? For Honduras, it appears that, as one commentator once put it, ‘it is preferable to be wrong for the right reasons than right for the wrong ones’. The Honduran political establishment and the judiciary deposed Zelaya for the right reasons, and although his expulsion was illegal, Zelaya’s actions, along with those of many international community members are proving Honduras’ political and judicial elites right, as forcing Zelaya’s return may create civil disruption, vandalism and terrorism at a minimum. The idea that members of the international community may be responsible for creating such a situation when what applies is a negotiated settlement is almost unheard-of in diplomatic history and speaks volumes of the moral quality of such international community members. Regarding Brazil, in particular, its decision to house Zelaya in its embassy is a blatant provocation for violence. In this regard, the Washington Office on Latin America’s Senior Associate for Human Rights and Development, Vicki Gass stated that ‘tensions could escalate very quickly’ and ‘urged everyone to resist the use of violence’.[1]

Honduras’ refusal to accept the return of embassadors from Spain, Argentina, Mexico and Venezuela (who had unilateraly broken bilateral relations with Honduras), to mediate in the crisis and/or simply return to the embattled Central American country did not come as surprise considering these governments’ strong diplomacy advocating for sanctions against Honduras’ interim government in different international forums (i.e., the European Union, the Organization of American States, and the United Nations). In fact, an OAS five member mission and two diplomats from Spain were not allowed into Honduras.[2]  

The ambivalent US position has been a cause for stark criticism against the Obama administration’s diplomatic and security teams. While slapping Honduras with trade, financial aid,  and visa sanctions it has not taken a firm public standing regarding the crisis. Yet it would be surprising if the US condoned the implications of Zelaya’s return: (1) because his term in office is about to expire; (2) because he should not influence a new electoral process, considering he faces serious legal accusations before the Honduran courts; and (3) because findings within the latest Congressional Research Service (CRS) report from the US Library of Congress, writen by CRS senior foreign law specialist Norma C. Gutierrez, conclude ‘[a]vailable sources indicate that the judicial and legislative branches applied constitutional and statutory law in the case against President Zelaya in a manner that was judged by the Honduran authorities from both branches of the government to be in accordance with the Honduran legal system’.[3]

Notwithstanding the report’s findings, there is some disagreement regarding the legal foundation under which the constitutional removal was based. Rosemary A. Joyce from the University of California, Berkley, for example, exemplifies such dissent. For professor Joyce, the CRS report contains four serious errors of analysis and scholarly research:

(1) … [It] cites a single Honduran legal analyst as a source of personal communications “confirming” conclusions she draws. Her source is a known supporter of the de facto regime in Honduras, Guillermo Pérez-Cadalso, who testified on behalf of the de facto regime in July’s hearings in the US Congress. This is not a disinterested source. There are numerous Honduran law professors, as well as constitutional law authorities in the US and Spain, on record in writing finding the Honduran Congress exceeded its legal authority in claiming to remove President Zelaya from office on June 28. None of these authorities is cited.

(2) … [the report], rather than analyze the arguments made by the Honduran Congress, as the questions … would require, creates … [its] own novel theory: that the Honduran Congress used a constitutional power given it to interpret the Honduran Constitution so as to justify its removal of President Zelaya.

Specifically, … [the report] suggests that the Congress must have interpreted its Constitutional authority to “disapprove” of the actions of a president, extending the definition of “disapproval” to include “removal from office”. Such a claim was not, however, actually made by the Honduran Congress in its June 28 actions. This is a post-hoc rationalization for their actions proposed by Ms. Gutierrez, apparently with guidance from Mr. Pérez-Cadalso, who is cited as confirming this rationalization in a footnote citing a phone conversation.

(3) In fact, on May 7, 2003, the Honduran Supreme Court had nullified the claimed power of the Congress to interpret the Constitution. Thus, it is not surprising that the Honduran Congress made no such claim on June 28, since they no longer could assert such authority, which the Supreme Court had rejected.

(4) Even during the period when the Honduran Congress acted under the belief it had the power to interpret the Constitution, it was bound by procedures that required it to explicitly note that it was interpreting the constitution, and to define the circumstances of the definitions they proposed.[4]

Professor Joyce makes some strong points, yet her claims need to be adequately substantiated and supported, especially regarding Honduran legal specialists supporting Zelaya, when, in fact, ‘every major Honduran institution supported the move, even members in Congress of his [Zelaya's] own political party, the Catholic Church and the country’s human rights ombudsman’.[5] In addition there are as many pro-Zelaya legal jurists in Spain as there are those against. Yet considering the Spanish government’s position on the Honduran crisis, Spain pro-Zelaya jurists cannot be considered ‘disinterested’, and therefore, neutral actors. Without detaching this analysis from its topic, it is surprising, to say the least, how members of the international legal community condone behaviors that breach human rights at large in Venezuela and Cuba, for example, while bringing the heat to bear upon the Honduran higher democratic institutions; former partners in international cooperation within SICA and OAS primarily. In the final analysis, fundamentally contextualizing the Hondurean institutions’ decision regarding President Zelaya’s actions as well as his intentions to breach the constitutional order need to be considered.

For the US it is time to make a call; will it support one of the few partners it has relied on for many bilateral arrangements in the region or will it decide to drop it out in the cold versus forces that on the one hand trade with the US while demonizing its foreign policy. On the balance, it is understandable to seek to improve US image in the region to obtain favorable concessions for US business, but when considering long-term objectives, is it not more american to seek to ensure the rule of law and democracy while supporting a troubled ally? Why aid Colombia and not Honduras as some question?[6]

 

[1] ‘President Zelaya’s return to Honduras’, WOLA Press Release (September 21, 2009), http://www.wola.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=viewp&id=996&Itemid=8 (last accessed September 27, 2009)

[2] ‘Honduras impide la entrada de dos funcionarios espanoles y de una mision de la OEA’, El Mundo (September 27, 2009), http://www.elmundo.es/elmundo/2009/09/27/internacional/1254079239.html (last accessed September 27, 2009)

[3] ‘Honduras: Constitutional Law Issues’, US Law Library of Congress, Directorate of Legal Research, LL File No. 2009-002965 (August 2009), p. 9, http://www.tortugadigital.com/blog/CRS_2009-002965HNRPT.pdf (last accessed September 27, 2009)

[4] Rosemary Joyce, ‘Library of Congress Report on Honduras filled with flaws’, Upside-down World (September 25, 2009), http://upsidedownworld.org/main/content/view/2130/68/ (last accessed September 27, 2009); see also, ‘Honduras: ennaltece al fuerte, machaca al debil’, GEES (September 24, 2009), http://www.gees.org/articulo/6740/ (last accessed September 27, 2009)

[5] ‘The Honduras mess’, The Wall Street Journal (September 23, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204488304574427403985118892.html (last accessed September 23, 2009)

[6] Florentino Portero, ‘El enredo Hondureno’, GEES (September 25, 2009), http://www.gees.org/articulo/6742/ (last accessed September 27, 2009)

 

 

 

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